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Abstract
This paper examines the current civil unrest in Hong Kong to determine the underlying causes that
are driving Occupy Central and its affiliates to pressure the Central Government in Beijing and the
Hong Kong government for universal suffrage. Drawing upon data from the 2003, 2007, and 2010
Asian Barometer, there has been a gradual decline in the level of trust in the Legislative Council
and Hong Kong government as the majority of Hong Kong residents have expressed increasing
uncertainty about their future economic situation along with their continual distrust in the abilities
of government officials to serve the public. From these findings, this paper discovered that the
systemic shortage of affordable and safe housing coupled with systemic deficiencies in
employment and income, rather than the sole lack of universal suffrage, may be some of the more
probable factors driving the push for universal suffrage in Hong Kong.
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The Current Situation in Hong Kong
On June 10, 2014, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the Central
People’s Government (Central Government) released the white paper, “The Practice of ‘One
Country, Two Systems’ Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” outlining the
future of universal suffrage in Hong Kong. 1 According to the white paper’s stipulations, the
Central Government asserts that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is an
inseparable administrative region under the complete jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). 2 As a local administrative region, the Central Government argues that the high
degree of autonomy granted to the HKSAR under the Sino-British Joint Declaration does not mean
that Hong Kong is a fully autonomous region or a decentralized city-state since it is still subjected
to the constraints found in the Chinese Constitution. 3 Furthermore, the Central Government,
operating under this rationale, stipulates that government officials and the judiciary have to display
loyal and patriotism to the PRC in order to successfully exercise their “responsibility of correctly
understanding and implementing the Basic Law” to ensure the continued stability and prosperity
of Hong Kong.4 Due to the white paper’s explicit stipulations, Gary Cheung and Tony Cheung of
the SCMP reported that this action is an aberration as the Central Government has traditionally
relied on a low-key approach to governing Hong Kong.5
In the wake of this announcement, pro-democracy grassroots organizations, most notably
Occupy Central, have pledged to stage a massive civil disobedience protest to disrupt Hong Kong’s
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financial districts to compel the Central Government to allow the implementation of universal
suffrage for the Chief Executive by 2017.6 Furthermore, the white paper has also been met with
widespread opposition from many government officials, professional organizations, and private
citizens who have expressed their disappointment with both the Central Government and the proBeijing Hong Kong government (HKGOV). To express their disappointment with HKGOV’s
approval of the white paper, Tony Cheung of the SCMP reported that only 27 out of 70 lawmakers
attended a luncheon with Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying.7 In addition to the disapproval of
lawmakers, the Hong Kong Bar Association has also strongly protested against the Central
Government’s attempt to infringe and suppress Hong Kong’s judicial independence by mandating
political loyalty as a requirement for members of the judiciary.8 Following the judiciary’s formal
protest on June 11, 2014, several prominent lawyers and legal scholars lobbied Westminster to
release classified documents, particularly those pertaining to Article 45 of the Basic Law, from the
pre-handover Joint Liaison Group to help clarify the position of universal suffrage prior to Hong
Kong’s return to the PRC in 1997.9
Following the protests of government officials and professional organizations, the Central
Government’s stipulations regarding the future of universal suffrage in Hong Kong has also
prompted private citizens to protest against Chinese interference in Hong Kong. In response to the
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white paper, Occupy Central subsequently announced that they will hold an unofficial referendum
to gauge public opinion about universal suffrage.10 Despite experiencing many technical setbacks,
Occupy Central has reported that they have received over 37,202 registration confirmations for the
upcoming referendum which has prompted organizers to open an additional fifteen mobile polling
stations on June 22 along with an additional ten on June 29. 11 With additional polls setup
throughout Hong Kong, Occupy Central has reported that nearly 800,000 people voted over the
ten day period of the referendum.12 Following the massive electoral turnout, the Hong Kong Police
reported that over 98,000 participants attended the annual July 1st march to display their support
for democracy in Hong Kong.13
In response to pro-democracy actions in Hong Kong, the Central Government operating in
conjunction with the HKGOV and pro-Beijing political and business organizations have launched
a campaign to discredit Occupy Central and its affiliates. According to the SCMP, Xu Ze, deputy
director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, declared that the Hong Kong
Bar Association had misinterpreted the white paper’s provisions regarding the judiciary.14 Further,
President Xi Jinping, unlike his predecessors, is willing to tighten control over Hong Kong since
the growing economic prosperity of other Chinese cities has rendered Hong Kong economically
insignificant to the wellbeing of the PRC.15 Expanding on the Central Government’s response,
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HKGOV has begun to implement the goals that were stipulated in the white paper. According to
the SCMP, the Hong Kong Education Bureau subsequently released a report stating that it will
consider modifying the current curriculum to help students develop a better understanding of the
Basic Law and the ‘one country, two systems’ model in Hong Kong.16 In addition to HKGOV’s
response, Chief Secretary Carrie Lam along with many pro-Beijing business organizations and
citizens have voiced their opposition toward the pro-democracy movement since it will lead to the
economic destabilization of Hong Kong. 17 Following this announcement, many pro-Beijing
organizations and citizens started to stage rallies and community events to discredit pro-democracy
groups.18
Despite the ideological conflicts separating the community, the Central Government
ultimately announced its decision to implement stricter guidelines which limited the number of
candidates and increased the nominating threshold requirement for candidates are trying to become
Chief Executive.19 In response to this decision, Occupy Central has pledged to continue its civil
disobedience movement to express its opposition with the Central Government’s election
guidelines.20 Following this declaration, Hong Kong universities students announced that they will
stage a week-long boycott of classes, starting on September 22, 2014, to oppose the Central
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Government’s decision.21 However, the week-long boycott quickly escalated as students, under
the leadership of pro-democracy student organizations, have stormed multiple HKGOV complexes
demanding the Central Government redact its decision and allow an open nomination process for
the 2017 election.22 At the moment of this paper’s writing, the civil disobedience movement has
entered its fifth consecutive week and continues to occupy and disrupt key roads and businesses
throughout Central, Admiralty, and Mong Kok.
With these development in mind, the Occupy Central civil disobedience movement
indicates there are severe underlying problems in Hong Kong society. As these protests continue,
Occupy Central can lead to severe ramifications for the Hong Kong people and on the future of
the city under Chinese rule. Therefore, the continuing developments and its potential ramifications
on Hong Kong’s future have lead me to ask the following question: Why have the people of Hong
Kong decided to pursue universal suffrage?
Methodology and Evidence
This paper relies on a mixed method approach to examine two explanatory variables to
answer the research question. The first explanatory variable examines whether the push for
universal suffrage was prompted by the increase in economic disparities in Hong Kong. The
second explanatory variable examines whether the push for universal suffrage was prompted by
the increase in social inequalities in Hong Kong. This paper relies on evidence from the following
primary sources: the Asian Barometer, the Hong Kong Housing Authority, the CSSA-Alliance,
The Hong Kong Council of Social Services, and the Society for Community Organization. Further,
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this paper also relies on evidence from the following secondary sources: newspapers, books, and
peer-reviewed articles.
Theoretical Paradigm: Historical Institutionalism
This paper uses the theoretical paradigm, historical institutionalism, to frame and analyze
the research question and two case studies. According to John Ikenberry, historical institutionalism
makes several assumptions about how institutions shape the ability of political actors and the
political landscape. Ikenberry assets that historical institutionalism assumes that “state policy and
orientations are mediated in decisive ways by political structures—such as institutional
configurations of government” which “…shape and constrain the goals and opportunities, and
actions of the groups and individuals operating within it.” 23 Further, Ikenberry asserts that
historical institutionalism dictates that it is necessary to consider the historical trends in order to
understand how institutions will develop and react. 24 Lastly, Ikenberry asserts that historical
institutionalism states that institutions are also path-dependent and can affect the number of
choices available to political actors.25 With this theory in mind, historical institutionalism is an
appropriate measure for this paper as it examines whether colonial policies have influenced
HKGOV’s policymaking to determine whether it has contributed to the Hong Kong people’s push
for universal suffrage.
Literature Review: The Past Three and a Half Decades in Hong Kong
During the late twentieth century, Hong Kong occupied an interesting place in the
international community as one of the last remnants of colonialism. However, Hong Kong’s days
as a colonial holding was gradually coming to an end as the United Kingdom, in 1982, decided to
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forgo its control over the city in exchange for stronger economic ties with the PRC. As a result,
this decision has sparked an ongoing debate about the future of Hong Kong and her people after
1997. In order to understand the current developments in Hong Kong, it is necessary to first review
and understand the debates surrounding Hong Kong’s future under the PRC in the following
manner. I begin by examining the literature written on the logistics of transferring Hong Kong to
the PRC. Then I will proceed to examine the literature written on the social and economic effects
on Hong Kong after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty. Following this examination, I will
proceed to examine the literature written on the effects of the ‘one country, two systems’ model
on present-day Hong Kong.
Before the resumption of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong, the ongoing negotiations
between the United Kingdom and the PRC prompted a discussion on the logistical processes of
transferring a capitalist city to an authoritative communist government. As the date of the transition
drew closer, the predictions of Hong Kong’s future were complemented with a substantial
discussion on how the colonial common law system will function under the civil law system in the
PRC. Berry Fong-Chung Hsu provides an extensive chronicle of the development of Hong Kong’s
common law system to determine if it will remain intact about 1997. During his research, Hsu
asserts that the United Kingdom was initially supposed to develop two separate legal systems for
the local and colonial communities.26 However, this plan was never implemented as the colonial
government feared that it would create political instability.27 As a result, the common law system
was gradually reshaped as local legal traditions were slowly incorporated. 28 Further, Hsu
conducted several surveys where he found that the majority of people in Hong Kong supported the
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current legal system.29 Due to this strong public support, Hsu is optimistic that the common law
system will remain in place after Hong Kong is returned to the PRC on July 1, 1997.30
Building on Hsu’s analysis of the common law system, Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark
focused on the implications that the Central Government’s newly minted Basic Law may have on
Hong Kong. Chan and Clark, unlike Hsu, does not offer a sanguine view of Hong Kong’s future
as the Basic Law does not contain adequate measures to ensure that Hong Kong’s high degree of
autonomy will be maintained to June 30, 2047. To support this claim, Chan asserts the British and
Chinese governments, with limited consultation from the local community, decided the terms and
conditions of the Basic Law.31 From this finding, Chan argues that Westminster’s unilateral action
has led to complete breakdown of trust between the Central Government and the local community
and jeopardized the development of democracy in Hong Kong.32 Further, Clark argues that the
certain provisions in the Basic Law, particularly Articles 17, 18, 23, will enable the Central
Government to unilaterally undermine the high degree of autonomy promised to Hong Kong under
the Sino-British Joint Declaration in order to establish complete control over every aspect of Hong
Kong society to their liking.33 Therefore, Chan and Clark ultimately believe that the Basic Law is
a farce designed to placate and distract the local community as the Central Government slowly
erodes Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy.
As the date of the handover drew increasingly closer, many scholars have focused their
attention on the potential implications that the “one country, two systems” model on the future
development of Hong Kong’s social system and policies. To explore the potential structure of

Hsu, 60-95.
30
Hsu, 137-138.
31
Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark, eds. The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for “Stability and Prosperity” under
Chinese Sovereignty? (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 25-29.
32
Chan and Clark, 29-32.
33
Chan and Clark, 38-39; 41-54.

10

Hong Kong’s social system, Gerard A. Postiglione and other scholars have compiled a series of
essays in their edited volume, Education and Society in Hong Kong: Toward One Country and
Two Systems, to provide some insights on the reversion’s potential impacts on the Hong Kong’s
educational policies and institutions.
Gerard A. Postiglione provides an extensive overview of the transitional problems that
HKGOV may face as it attempts to reform its colonial education system and social policies to meet
the challenges of life under Chinese rule. Aside from this chronicle, Postiglione specifically
examines whether a reformed education system will help streamline the transitional process and
prepare the upcoming generation of leaders to lead Hong Kong into the future.34 In his analysis,
Postiglione determined that there are three possible trajectories that HKGOV may consider as it
reforms the education system. First, Postiglione proposes that HKGOV may decide to maintain
the current education system in order to ensure minimal social upheaval during the transitional
process.35 Second, Postiglione proposes that Hong Kong may become more democratized which
could make educational reforms more difficult as interest groups compete to implement their
respective ideas.36 Lastly, Postiglione proposes the Central Government, upon resuming control of
Hong Kong, may give more influence to pro-Beijing schools to determine which policies will be
implemented to reform the education system. 37 After examining these options, Postiglione
strongly believes that the second trajectory (democratization) is the surest way to ensure a
harmonist relationship between Hong Kong and the PRC. 38 Despite this belief, Postiglione’s
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research indicates that the reversion may prompt widespread changes in education that can impact
the rest of society.
Besides Postiglione’s survey on the future of Hong Kong’s education system, Anthony E.
Sweeting examines how certain historical processes have influenced the development of education
policies. Sweeting examines several historical processes to illuminate its effects on the education
system.39 During his analysis of colonization, Sweeting asserts that the British did not plan for an
independent Hong Kong since the majority of the population were transient migrants and refuges
from the mainland which dissuaded the development of a formal education system.40 Furthermore,
Sweeting asserts that industrialization in Hong Kong influenced the development of new
educational configurations as it lead to a transition from all-age single-class schools to agedifferentiated multi-class schools structured and taught by specialists.41 Due to this shift, Sweeting
asserts that industrialization also prompted the use of modern technologies in the classroom which
led to the introduction of modern sciences into classroom curriculum. 42 In addition to these
influences, Sweeting has also asserts that bureaucratization, despite the negative effects brought
about by centralization, has addressed the gross inequalities in education.43 With this in mind,
Sweeting argues that these historical vestiges will continue to persist and influence the
development of educational policies after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty.
Using this historical background, Cheng Kai Ming examines how Hong Kong was able to
implement numerous reforms to radically expand and change its education system despite being
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governed by a departing autocratic government. 44 Through his research, Cheng provides a
comprehensive overview on how the colonial government solely relied on both technical expertise
and consultative measures to develop and implement educational policies. 45 Aside from this
overview, Cheng asserts that the looming departure has prompted the colonial government to
renege on its consultative processes that has traditionally been used to develop and implement
policies.46 Due to this shift, Cheng argues that the colonial government has established a dangerous
precedent that will delegitimize the incoming government or enable the incoming government to
unilaterally create and implement educational policies without any regards to its citizens.47
Following up on Cheng’s examination, Paul Morris explores how the transition of Hong
Kong will impact the development of secondary school curriculum.48 During his analysis, Morris
found that the impending transition has led the Hong Kong Education Department to revise
textbooks and curriculum to include pro-Beijing political and social lessons for secondary schools
in order to ensure that students are able to integrate as Chinese citizens.49 Furthermore, Morris
found that Hong Kong Education also adopted the School-Based Curriculum Project Scheme to
centralize the process of approving, developing, and implementing of educational projects.50 With
that in mind, Morris believes that these policies will easily enable any controlling party to
singlehandedly determine the future of education in Hong Kong. Besides the transition’s
implications on the school curriculum, Ching-kwan Lee and Tak-sing Cheung chronicles the
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debates surrounding the process governing the allocation of spots in secondary schools throughout
Hong Kong. In their analysis, Lee and Cheung found that the Hong Kong education system has
traditionally been tailored to the political and economic elite.51 To address this social inequality,
the colonial government implemented a series of reforms during the 1970s and 1980s to ensure
that every child had an opportunity to receive an education.52 Due to these reforms, the political
and economic elite successfully lobbied the colonial government to adopt the Direct Subsidy
Scheme (DSS) which effectively rolled back the progressive reforms made in the 1970s and
1980s.53 Under the DSS, Lee and Cheung noted that this policy would allow prestigious schools
to selectively recruit wealthy students while less prestigious schools are left to recruit poorer
students.54 Despite the revival of classism under the DSS, Lee and Cheung believe the colonial
government should focus on improving the quality of education rather than ensuring social equality
in the education system in order to address Hong Kong’s brain-drain problem. As a result, Lee and
Cheung indicates that the Central Government may continue this policy to ensure Hong Kong’s
economic prowess.
Shifting from Lee and Cheung’s general analysis on secondary school reforms, Grace C.L.
Mak investigates whether educational reforms have created more opportunities for women in the
workplace and classroom in her essay, “The Schooling of Girls in Hong Kong: Progress and
Contradictions in the Transition.” Throughout her analysis, Mak asserts that education reforms
have allowed women to gradually attain a higher level of education.55 As a result, Mak found that
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women, despite their rising educational attainment, have made limited headway into the workplace
as they still faced abject discrimination by employers.56 Therefore, Mak predicts that the social
inequalities and discrimination faced by women may continue to persist or even worsen after Hong
Kong is the returned to the PRC.
Aside from the issue of equality in the education system, Herbert Pierson provides an indepth overview of the various language and communication issues that students may face after
1997. In his analysis, Pierson found that the Hong Kong Education Bureau has begun to implement
pilot and training programs to introduce Putonghua into the general curriculum.57 Coupled with
this finding, Pierson also found that the majority of students perceived both Putonghua and English
rather than Cantonese as a valuable skill.58 Due to these findings, Pierson believes that Putonghua
will most likely become the de jure language in Hong Kong after 1997. Further, Ora W.Y. Kwo
expands on Pierson’s analysis on language issues by examining the arguments and potential
policies surrounding on which language should serve as the medium of instruction in Hong Kong
schools. 59 After evaluating these options, Kwo agrees with Pierson that there should be more
emphasis on incorporating Putonghua into the classroom curriculum, but only if the government,
not the free-market, dictates it development. Therefore, Kwo and Pierson indicates that there may
be an erosion of the local culture as Putonghua and other mainland cultural imports are adopted.
Besides the speculations and debates on how the Central Government will shape social
policies in Hong Kong, scholars have also focused on how the close-knitted relationship between
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the ruling government and business elite have affected the lives of ordinary people. To understand
the potential implications of this relationship, Leo F. Goodstadt offers a comprehensive historical
account of this relationship and its effects from the late-nineteenth century to present-day over the
course of three books, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict Between Public Interest and Private Profits
in Hong Kong, Profits and Politics and Panics: Hong Kong’s Banks and the Making of a Miracle
Economy, 1935-1985, and Poverty in the Midst of Affluence: How Hong Kong Mismanaged Its
Prosperity.
In his initial research, Goodstadt provides a comprehensive review of the colonial
government’s relationship with the local political and economic elite. In his analysis, Goodstadt
found this collusion between colonial officials and the local political and economic elite enabled
both parties to achieve private political and financial gain at the expense of the ordinary citizens.60
As a result, Goodstadt asserts that the collusion between the colonial government and the local
elite actually hindered the development of democracy which has set a dangerous precedent for
Hong Kong’s political future. 61 Due to the efficiency of this public and private relationship,
Goodstadt noted that the Central Government sought to continue this style of government by
enshrining it into the Basic Law.62 As a result, Goodstadt strongly believes that continuation of
this collusion will continue to exacerbate the existing political, social, and economic inequalities
in Hong Kong.
Expanding on this initial research, Goodstadt delves further into the colonial government’s
relationship with the banking industry to discern the implications on economic development in
Hong Kong. In his analysis, Goodstadt offers an in-depth historical analysis of the colonial
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government’s economic policies and its effects on the local banking industry. In his analysis,
Goodstadt found that the colonial government had intentionally neglected to develop and
implement effective policies and regulations to control the local banking industry.63 Due to the
lack of effective controls, Goodstadt asserts that the colonial government’s actions directly
contributed the instability of the entire banking industry.64 Despite the severity instability of the
banking industry, Goodstadt asserts that the local community played an instrumental role in
stabilizing the banking industry. 65 Therefore Goodstadt believes that the persistent lack of
regulation and accountability has continued to contribute to a variety of economic problems in
present-day Hong Kong.
Besides examining the implications of the collusion between the colonial government,
local elite, and the banking industry, Goodstadt argues that HKGOV and the Central Government,
to a certain extent, have contributed to the resurgence of poverty in Hong Kong. During his analysis,
Goodstadt asserts that HKGOV has neglected to provide an adequate level of social services which
has led to an increase in the amount of people living in poverty.66 As a result, Goodstadt found that
the effects of past colonial policies coupled with HKGOV’s current policies have severely crippled
the local community’s ability to attain an appropriate standard of living. Further, Goodstadt asserts
that the transition of Hong Kong also witnessed the persistence of the collusion between the public
and private sectors and the patriarchal colonial mentality have continued the belief that the
impoverished segments of the community is still a transient parasitic organism that does not
deserve any form of assistance.67
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Shortly after Hong Kong’s revision back to the PRC, many scholars have examined the
success and sustainability of the “one country, two systems” model. Throughout this field of
research, several scholars have discovered that the “one country, two systems” model has
promoted the resurgence of political and economic elitism while eroding the rule of law in Hong
Kong. Steve Shipp offers three potential futures that may manifest in Hong Kong. First, Hong
Kong may experience a similar fate of Weihai, a former special administrative zone, that was
leased to the British in 1898 and returned to the Kuomintang in 1930 on the condition that the port
city remained a duty-free trading area. 68 Despite this promise, Weihai eventually suffered an
economic downturn which prompted the Kuomintang to raise taxes and end the city’s duty-free
status.69 Applying this precedent to Hong Kong, Shipp argues that Hong Kong’s reunification with
the PRC may trigger an economic collapse which may prompt the Central Government to assert
direct control over the city’s affairs. Expanding on this prediction, Shipp offers two additional
predictions from the authors, Nien Cheng and Ross Terrill. Differing from Shipp’s moderately
optimistic prediction, Nien Cheng paints a much starker picture of Hong Kong’s future under the
PRC. Drawing from her experiences of the Cultural Revolution, Cheng asserts that the Central
Government will reduce Hong Kong from an international financial hub into an exclusive vacation
resort for the political and economic elite to engage in activities that are prohibited in the
mainland.70 In contrast to Cheng’s draconian outlook, Ross Terrill offers two different predictions
on Hong Kong’s future in which the Central Government will either maintain the status quo or
will neglect to provide the necessary resources to maintain Hong Kong’s infrastructure and
standard of living.71
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Expanding on Shipp’s analysis, Wong Yiu-Chung argues that the “one country, two system”
has enabled the Central Government to slowly erode Hong Kong’s autonomy.72 In his analysis,
Wong highlights six instances where HKGOV directly intervened in the political and legal
processes to assist individuals with ties to the Central Government while neglecting to assist
individuals that were attempting to seek recourse from the Central Government.73 Expanding on
this Wong’s findings, Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan asserts that the Central Government, through the
“one country, two systems” model, can exert undue influence onto HKGOV.74 Furthermore, Chan
found that Hong Kong’s growing economic integration with the PRC may negatively affect the
city’s status as an international financial hub.75 With these implications in mind, Chan and Wong
believe that the “one country, two systems” model does not protect, but rather weakens, Hong
Kong’s political, social, and economic institutions. Following Chan’s analysis, Albert H.Y. Chen
and Anne S.Y. Cheung examines a series of legal cases to determine the status of the rule of law
in the HKSAR. In their analysis, Chen and Cheung found that there is a significant lack of judicial
independence as the Central Government has overturned several key decisions from the Court of
Final Appeals.76 Furthermore, Chen and Cheung found that HKGOV, despite the guarantees of
free speech and religion in the Basic Law, enacted legislation to specifically target certain
“dissident” political organizations (e.g. Falun Gong) from exercising their legal rights in Hong
Kong. 77 In addition to these instances, Chen and Cheung also found that there was a lack of
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consistency in the application of laws as there were instances where the prosecution choose not to
prosecute an individuals with ties to the Central Government or HKGOV.78 Due to these legal
inconsistencies, Chen and Cheung seem to convey that the rule of law is merely a façade in Hong
Kong.
With these studies in mind, the literature covers a broad range of topics on the political,
economic, and social developments in Hong Kong. Despite this comprehensive account, the
literature is still incomplete since many of these works were written during the twentieth and
twenty-first century. As a result, the majority studies do not directly offer any insights into the
ongoing civil disobedience movement in Hong Kong. Therefore, this paper will contribute to the
existing literature by examining the underlying circumstances that is driving the current push for
universal suffrage.
Employment and Income Deficiencies in Hong Kong
After the promulgation of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Qing Dynasty was forced to
cede Hong Kong to the United Kingdom. Under the auspice of the British government, colonial
officials instituted a laissez faire government as the primary policymaking mechanism to govern
the indigenous population and the colonial population. 79 Over the course of their tenure, the
colonial government recognized Hong Kong as a vital strategic economic and military hub in East
Asia. Due to the colony’s strategic importance, the colonial government, unlike their Indian and
Southeast Asian counterparts, decided to not enact reforms to replace the authoritarian system with
a representative government. Instead, the colonial officials appointed the local economic and
political elites to serve as the liaison between the indigenous population and the colonial
government. Despite being the liaison between the indigenous and colonial communities, the local
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elite exploited their relationship with colonial officials to establish a pro-business environment that
significantly increase their economic standing rather than introduce economic and social reforms
to increase the quality of life in Hong Kong.80
Table I: Public Trust in the Legislative Council and HKGOV
(2003)
(2007)
Trust in the Legislative
Quite a Lot of
Quite a Lot of
Council
Trust
Trust
Trust in the Hong Kong
Quite a Lot of
Quite a Lot of
Govt.
Trust
Trust

(2010)
Not Very Much
Trust
Not Very Much
Trust

Source: Asian Barometer Hong Kong Survey

As Table I indicates, the public’s trust in the Legislative Council (Legco) and HKGOV has
gradually declined from 2003 to 2010. With the recent developments in Hong Kong, the ongoing
civil unrest suggests that there has been a further decrease in the level of public trust in the Legco
and HKGOV. Throughout the course of these protests, Occupy Central has repeatedly demanded
that the Central Government in Beijing fulfill its prescribed duty in the Basic Law (see: Articles
46, 68, and Annexes I and II) and the Joint Sino-British Declaration to permit universal suffrage
in elections for positions in the Executive Council and the Legco.81 Upon examining Occupy
Central’s rationale behind its demands for universal suffrage, there is a positive correlation
between the lack of universal suffrage (independent variable) and the decline of trust (dependent
variable) in the Legco and HKGOV. Despite this positive correlation, there is no supporting
evidence to suggest that a causal relationship exist as many authoritarian regimes have managed
to survive throughout history without granting universal suffrage to its citizens. Therefore, the lack
of direct causation suggests that there are other possible variables that may have an impact on the
level of public trust in the Legco and HKGOV. Drawing upon the available literature, Goodstadt’s
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research on the government-business nexus’ negligence in promulgating social and economic
reforms, Hsu’s research on the potential implications brought about by the legal incompatibility of
the common law system with the civil law system, Chan and Clark’s research on the limited
protections of the Basic Law, Postiglione et al.’s research on Beijing’s interference into Hong
Kong’s social and cultural systems, and Wong et al.’s research on the favoritism shown by the
legal system in matters pertaining to or involving individuals with political connections to the
Central Government or with familial connections to local civil servants are several potential factors
that may be responsible for the decline in trust and the subsequent demand for universal suffrage.
Table II: Economic and Political Well-Being and Trust in the Legislative Council
β
Sig.
β
Sig.
β
(2003) (2003) (2007) (2007) (2010)
National Economic Condition
0.040
0.281
0.047
0.047
0.307
Current Economic Situation
0.073
0.064
0.124
0.336
0.014
Future Economic Situation
0.091
0.001
0.165
0.001
0.130
Political Efficacy
-0.035
0.574
0.143
0.002 -0.032
Trust in Government Officials
-0.251
0.000
0.090
0.000
0.241
Monthly Income
-0.010
0.638
0.001
0.607
0.002

Sig.
(2010)
0.000
0.850
0.020
0.481
0.000
0.230

Source: Asian Barometer Hong Kong Survey

Table III: Economic and Political Well-Being and Trust in Hong Kong Government
β
Sig.
β
Sig.
β
(2003) (2003) (2007) (2007) (2010)
National Economic Condition
0.185
0.000
0.027
0.647
0.245
Personal Economic Situation
0.162
0.000 -0.072
0.295
-0.001
Future Economic Situation
0.045
0.110
0.112
0.000
0.100
Political Efficacy
0.058
0.379
0.044
0.267
0.052
Trust in Government Officials
-0.425
0.000
0.095
0.002
0.136
Monthly Income
-0.060
0.004
0.002
0.265
0.004

Sig.
(2010)
0.000
0.988
0.043
0.193
0.000
0.004

Source: Asian Barometer Hong Kong Survey

As Table II and III demonstrates, the public’s lack of trust in government officials and the
public’s uncertainty in their future economic situation are consistent predictors that can be used to
determine the level of public trust in the Legco and HKGOV. Aside from these two variables, there
is no indication that the remaining variables have any significant effects on the level of public trust
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in the Legco and HKGOV. The lack of statistical significance may be related to the varying effects
that each remaining variable has on residents residing in different districts. With that in mind, the
overall condition of the national economy may only affect the level of public trust of residents
living in the New Territories rather than residents living in the Kowloon Peninsula. Furthermore,
monthly income and current economic situation may also not be accurate predictors of public trust
as a family living in Mong Kok may have higher living costs that a family living in the New
Territories. Due to the variations in living costs and proximity to the mainland, an individual may
have different opinions of the government. Lastly, political efficacy may not be an accurate
predictor of public trust since elections are only limited to district-level positions and political
participation has been traditionally discouraged by cultural norms and historical precedents. From
these results, the public’s distrust of government officials and uncertainty of their future economic
situation may be some of the causal factors that are driving the push for universal suffrage.
Shortly after the resumption of Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the Central Government in
Beijing adopted the colonial government’s model of indirect government and continued to
exclusively rely on the local elite to govern Hong Kong. Under the direction of local elite, HKGOV
adopted austere private sector practices and gradually enacted additional pro-business legislation
while neglecting to introduce any substantial employment protections, social services, and social
security programs to protect the grassroots.82 As these policies came into effect, many government
employees were forced to seek new employment in the private sector where they, despite their
qualifications, had to accept lower wages which inadvertently triggered a further reduction in the
median wage as the supply of workers surpassed the demand for workers.83 Aside from enacting
these draconian austerity measures, HKGOV also failed to implemented legislation and policies
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to mitigate the ramifications of the economic downturns on employment opportunities during the
1997 East Asian Financial Crisis and the 2003 SARS epidemic.84
Coupled with these initial policies, HKGOV also enacted legislation to reduce the amount
of social welfare assistance by ten to twenty percent, to tighten the eligibility threshold for social
services, and to lengthen the requirement for permanent residency in Hong Kong to seven years.85
According to the CSSA-Alliance, these policies significantly burdens new immigrants, especially
those with children that are permanent residents, since it restricts their abilities to seek employment
which forces them to live on their children’s comprehensive social security assistance (CSSA)
allowance. Further, the reduction in social services and welfare were followed by the enactment
of additional legislation that mandated CSSA recipients to seek some form of employment or risk
a reduction of their social benefits.86 Due to the new regulations imposed on the disbursement of
social benefits and the influx of overqualified government workers into the private sector, HKGOV
effectively relegated the majority of lower-middle and working class employees (underclass) to
short-term ‘dead-end’ jobs where the median wage ranges from HK$4800 to HK$5200.87
With their limited earning power, the majority of the underclass are forced to spend the
majority of their income and social welfare allowance in order to maintain a bare minimum
standard of living as the cost of living continues to exponentially increase.88 Aside from the plight
of the underclass, the Hong Kong Council of Social Services (HKCSS) found that the purchasing
power of all non-CSSA grassroots households, from FY1999-2000 to FY2009-2010, has gradually
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decreased as the inflation of basic necessities continue to outpace the increase in wages.89 As a
result, the combination of the lack of long-term employment opportunities and the rising price
inflation of basic necessities have stifled social mobility in Hong Kong. To illustrate the
ramifications of this general trend on the grassroots, this section examines how HKGOV’s
negligence and mismanagement have affected the residents living in Shum Shui Po, Tin Shui Wai,
and Tung Chung.
Shum Shui Po is a district located in the northwestern part of the Kowloon Peninsula that
played host to the majority of the manufacturing industry throughout the 1950s and 1970s. In
comparison with the other seventeen districts, the median income and living conditions in Shum
Shui Po are among the lowest in Hong Kong as employment shifted from the manufacturing sector
to the service sector.90Despite the dismal state of Shum Shui Po, HKGOV has continued to neglect
enacting legislation and policies to create long-term structural changes to alleviate and curb the
rate of poverty.91 According to the HKCSS, the responsibilities of poverty alleviation and social
assistance are delegated to non-governmental and local community-based organizations. Under
the direction of these organizations, social workers and volunteers have developed temporary
domestic worker employment opportunities for the unemployed in order to provide a source of
income and to develop a community network in Shum Shui Po.92 Although these programs were
generally successful, the finite power of non-governmental and community-based organizations
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have only temporarily alleviate the symptoms rather than resolve the systemic factors underlying
poverty.93
Housing Deficiencies in Hong Kong
Aside from the lack of reforms in Shum Shui Po, HKGOV’s mismanagement in urban
planning and the construction of new urban developments in the New Territories and Lantau Island
has led to major deficiencies of critical social and economic infrastructure. Among the different
urban developments situated in the New Territories, Tin Shui Wai is the epitome of the dismal
mismanagement of government planning as social and economic deficiencies have led to high rates
of poverty and unemployment among its residents.94 Since the inception of Tin Shui Wai in the
early 1990s, HKGOV has only offered limited assistance to address the high rate of poverty and
unemployment. In response to the lack of governmental support, various non-profits organizations
have introduced several economic infrastructure to reduce unemployment and poverty. According
to the HKCSS, non-profit organizations have established an organic mushroom farm in 2007 to
provide residents with some form of income along with social programs to help residents build a
community identity and network. 95 Despite the efforts of these organizations, these initiatives
cannot guarantee that residents will have access to stable long-term employment and income to
ensure an adequate standard of living. As a result, Tin Shui Wai residents are forced to continue
living in a marginal state of existence.
Coupled with the humanitarian debacle in Tin Shui Wai, HKGOV’s mismanagement has
also affected the urban development of Tung Chung. Located near Lantau Island and Kai Tak
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International Airport, HKGOV began development the Tung Chun in 2007 in order to increase the
availability of housing and amenities to accommodate white-collar workers and tourists visiting
the surrounding tourist attractions. 96 Despite the surrounding economic opportunities and
prosperity, Tung Chung has remained relatively economically underdeveloped since its inception
in 2007. Coupled with the lack of economic opportunities, HKGOV has relocated the majority of
recent public housing recipients to Tung Chung. As a result, the influx of low-income and loweducated residents and the lack of economic opportunities have forced Tung Chung residents to
swallow the high-cost of transportation to neighboring cities to find employment. 97 Although
residents are able to find employment, the low median income (ranging from HK$4000 to
HK$6000) combined with high transportation costs (ranging from HK$10 to HK$23 per trip) have
made Tung Chung the poorest area in Hong Kong. 98 In response to the lack of government
intervention, local non-profits and community-based organizations have implemented an assetbased community development model to provide critical social, economic, and academic services
along with stipends and household items to assist residents.99
After nearly two decades in power, HKGOV has failed to implement sufficient safeguards
and long-term development plans to ensure that its citizens are able to attain and maintain a stable
standard of living. In response to these shortcomings, various non-profits, non-governmental, and
community-based organizations have assumed the role of government by developing programs to
provide critical economic and social assistance services. However, the finite power of these
organizations means these assistance programs can only be maintained for a limited amount of
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time since they are completely dependent on community support. Due to the fragility of these
programs, these organizations, until receiving additional government assistance, can only effect
short-term changes rather than long-term reforms to reduce employment and income deficiencies
plaguing society. As a result, the majority of citizens have continued to distrust both Legco and
HKGOV officials since they have repeatedly broken promises to introduce legislation to ensure
economic stability. Therefore, the lack of economic stability coupled with governmental
negligence may be one of the key factors underlying the current civil unrest in Hong Kong.
Aside from HKGOV’s failure to implement long-term reforms to ensure a stable economic
future, the shortage of adequate and affordable public and private housing is another possible factor
that may have triggered the current civil unrest in Hong Kong. Before examining the current
housing issue, it is necessary to first have an understanding of the development of housing policies
in Hong Kong. After the resumption of British sovereignty in 1945, the colonial government had
to address the increasing influx of refugees entering Hong Kong to escape the political turmoil in
the mainland.100 Initially, the colonial government refused to directly intervene and exclusively
relied on the Hong Kong Settlers’ Housing Corporation (HKSHC) and Hong Kong Housing
Society (HKHS) to construct or find housing for the incoming refugees.101 However, the colonial
government’s indirect approach ultimately failed to provide sufficient funding and support for the
HKSHC and the HKHS to build adequate tenement buildings and temporary squatter settlements
to accommodate the refugees. Due to the lack of basic sanitation and safety measures, the colonial
government’s lack of direct intervention resulted in a preventable major fire in 1953 that destroyed
the entire squatter settlement in Shek Kip Mei.102 In response to the Shek Kip Mei disaster, the
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colonial government subsequently abandoned its non-interventionist stance to directly implement
multiple reforms to resettle the displaced residents into apartment complexes.103 Following these
initial reforms, colonial officials continued to implement additional housing reforms throughout
the next three decades to upgrade existing housing units and to construct additional housing units
to ensure an ample supply of living space for the refugees.104 Despite their focus on rehousing the
refugees, colonial officials failed to develop any mechanisms or enact legislation to ensure that
every public and private housing unit met a minimum safety and hygiene standard.105
Following the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, HKGOV inherited a dismal housing
policy that failed to include plans to improve an individual’s average living space or their ability
to purchase their own apartment.106 However, instead of addressing these deficiencies, HKGOV,
under the direction of the local elite, began to systemically dismantle the colonial housing reforms
and institutions. 107 Throughout this process, HKGOV was pressured by the private sector to
auction its inventory of 1,000 undeveloped housing sites (capable of providing about 730,000
public and private housing units) to private real estate developers on the premise that they will
quickly rectify the existing housing problems.108 Coupled with the liquation of government-owned
land, HKGOV also further reduced the availability of public housing which has hindered the
process of relocating people living in condemned or dilapidated housing units to acceptable living
spaces.109 In response to the private sector’s monopoly, the public has placed enormous pressure
on HKGOV to enact legislation to regulate the private housing market and to reenter the housing
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market to ensure affordable public housing. Despite the public’s pressure, HKGOV has continued
to refuse to address this issue on the premise that there is a shortage of land. However, there is no
basis for HKGOV’s premise since private and public housing respectively occupy 76 sq. km and
16 sq. km out of the 1,104 sq. km of available developed and undeveloped land.110 As a result, the
increasing housing disparity suggests that HKGOV and the local elite are actively colluding
together to benefit from the private sector’s monopolization of the housing market over the past
decade and a half.
Figure I: The Growth of Property Purchase Prices in Hong Kong (1997-2014)

Source: Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department
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Figure II: The Growth of Property Rental Rates in Hong Kong (1997-2014)

Source: Hong Kong Rating and Valuation Department

As Figures I and II demonstrates, the private sector’s monopolization of the real estate
market has exponentially increased the purchase and rental prices of existing and new housing
units. Combined with the HKGOV’s mismanagement of its housing policies, the employment
deficiencies coupled with the slow increase of wages has rendered the underclass and the middle
class unable to afford the exorbitant purchase or rental price. Besides the limitations imposed onto
the underclass and the middle class’ abilities to access housing, the majority of the post-80s and
post-90s generations are further constrained as their wages cannot cover the purchase or rental cost
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of private housing while rendering them ineligible for public housing.111 Aside from the exorbitant
cost of living in private housing market, the shortage of public housing has forced the eligible
underclass and the post-80s and 90s generations applicants to wait three years or more before
gaining access to a public rental apartment.112 In response to this shortage, the Hong Kong Housing
Authority (HKHA) announced plans to increase the supply of public housing by 9,900 units in
FY2014-2015, 23,300 units in FY2015-2016, 14,300 units in FY2016-2017, 23,100 units in
FY2017-2018, and 17,000 units in FY2018-2019.113 Despite these projections, the HKHA has
failed to achieve its goal of 9,900 units since it has only managed to construct an additional 990
units in FY2014-2015.114
Due to the failure of HKGOV and the HKHA to provide additional public housing, the
shortage of public housing units coupled with the increasing cost of private housing has forced the
majority of the underclass and the post-80s and 90s generation to live in subdivided apartments,
cubicle homes, illegally modified homes, and cage homes. 115 With the demand for housing
increasing, the number of partitioned apartments and its various variations have doubled over the
past five years.116 However, despite the increased availability of these facilities, the tenants, due
to the abolition of rent control and rental rights in 1998 and 2004, have virtually no bargaining
111
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power with their landlords who are able to unilaterally increase the rent far beyond the inflation
rate and subject them to at will evictions.117 Coupled with the lack of rights and protections, the
increased demand for housing has also forced many tenants to accept subpar living conditions. For
instance, tenants are forced to endure cramped and filthy conditions where they are forced to live
in unhygienic environments and share limited hygiene and cooking facilities with numerous other
tenants.118 Aside from deficiencies in environmental hygiene, tenants are also forced to cope with
building degradation and safety deficiencies that place the residents at an increased risk of fire,
building collapses and other hazardous situations.119
Despite the potential threats posed by these accommodations on human life, HKGOV and
the HKHA has filed to implement the necessary reforms to ensure that its citizens have access to
an adequate and safe living space. Furthermore, HKGOV, under the direction of Chief Executive
Leung Chun-ying, have only taken token measures to address and resolve these deficiencies. As a
result, the shortage of affordable housing has caused the majority of citizens to doubt their future
stability of their economic and living situation which may has prompted a decline in trust of Legco
and HKGOV officials. Therefore, HKGOV’s inability to address the widespread shortage and the
exorbitant costs of housing could be one of the key factors underlying the civil unrest in Hong
Kong.
Conclusion: So why is Hong Kong protesting?
Throughout the course of the civil unrest in Hong Kong, many media outlets have portrayed
the umbrella revolution as a movement toward universal suffrage and additional freedoms in Hong

117
Society of Community Organization, 2012/2013 Research Report on Cage Homes, Cubicles, and Subdivided Flats
(Hong Kong: Society of Community Organization, 2013), 5.
118
Daniel Dawn, “Subdivided Housing Issues of Hong Kong: Causes and Solutions” (PhD diss., Hong Kong Institute
of Education, 2013), 23-24.
119
Dawn 25-26.

33

Kong. Despite this popular rendition of the social movement, the simple allegory of an oppressive
government driving its citizens to push for universal suffrage or additional rights only occurs in a
perfect world. As the paper shows, there are numerous systemic social and economic issues that
have persisted throughout the colonial era to the present day that the British, Chinese, and Hong
Kong governments have left partially or completely unresolved. Therefore, these systemic issues,
many of which have widespread implications on the community’s welfare, are more likely to be
the primary grievances that are driving these elements to strive for universal suffrage to determine
their own faith.
Although this paper only examines two potential factors to understand what are the causes
behind the push for universal suffrage, the lack of safe and affordable housing and the deficiencies
in employment and income have been long-term systemic issues in Hong Kong for the past three
and a half decades. With that in mind, the Occupy Central movement along with the other factions
participating in the civil unrest should not be perceived as a movement for democracy but rather
as a movement that is trying to rectify the growing disparities in Hong Kong by pursuing universal
suffrage to effect social changes.
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